Thursday, May 25, 2017

Gays don't see fidelity, monogamy as intrinsic to marriage

Since the GSS began explicitly asking about sexual orientation in 2008, I've been tracking it alongside rates of marriage infidelity. Every other homosexual has cheated on a spouse while just 1-in-7 heterosexuals have. That figure has stayed remarkably consistent over the five iterations of the survey that have been completed from 2008 through 2016.

A common objection to the conclusion that homosexuals have different expectations for the institution of marriage than heterosexuals do is that gays being surveyed may have been in Will and Grace-style marriages before same-sex marriage was legalized through judicial fiat. Now that their lifestyles have been normalized, they'll be no more likely to cheat on spouses they're romantically interested in than straight people are.

Having actually interacted with gay men, that strikes me as total nonsense. Open relationships, if not the norm among buggers, are at least quite common. The expectation of an open relationship between man and wife is an unusual exception. That's not at all the case among homosexuals.

Fortunately, the GSS also asks respondents how they feel, morally, about extramarital affairs. The following graph shows the percentages, by sexual orientation, who identify it as "always wrong". All responses are from 2008 onward, after same-sex marriage had been legalized in multiple states and it had become obvious to everyone that it was only a matter of time before leviathan would bless it nationwide:


Homosexuals simply don't view marriage as definitionally monogamous. This was a leading argument against same-sex marriage put forth by badwhites who futilely opposed same-sex marriage in the early- and mid-2000s. They asserted that the lax standards characterizing gay relationships would seep into societal expectations for the institution of marriage itself if gays were permitted to marry one another. Their concerns were snarkily dismissed as homophobic fear-mongering, but they've been proven right and the sodomite apologists proven wrong.

That won't make any difference, of course. The cultural ratchet only turns one direction--always to the left, towards humanity-denying equalism.

With same-sex marriage taken care of, the next major push will either be for the normalization of pedophilia or open marriages. My money is on the latter coming first. The New York Times promotes it fairly frequently, most recently a couple of weeks ago in an article entitled "Is an open marriage a happier marriage?"

When the Muslim population in the US grows large enough, the push for polygamy will get going as well. At the moment, though, its association with Mormonism is keeping it off the table.

GSS variables used: SEXORNT, XMARSEX(1)

Tuesday, May 23, 2017

Social class and fertility in 21st century America

Several years ago I looked at fertility among whites by sex and intelligence (as measured by Wordsum scores) and found that to the extent that the trend is dysgenic, it is almost exclusively so among women. Among whites, high IQ men have as many children as low IQ men do. That's not the case for women, and education--rather than intelligence per se--looks like the 'culprit'.

A basic understanding of mating market dynamics makes this easy to comprehend. Many men have no problem marrying 'down' in status. It often makes for a happier relationship for both sexes in those situations. Heartiste calls this the Boss-Secretary Sexual Strategy (BoSSS).

Women, however, do have a problem marrying down. And by the time women have spent a decade in college climbing the social ladder they're not as attractive as they were when they started, while men who spend a (productive) decade in college are more attractive than they were when they started.

Here's looking at that from another angle, that of social class. It's elegant in its simplicity and utility in that it combines several attributes--intelligence, income, education, etc--into a single variable, albeit a self-reported one. The GSS allows four responses for social class; lower-, working-, middle-, and upper-, with the distribution among non-Hispanic whites at about 5%-40%-50%-5%, respectively.

All data is from 2000 onward among whites aged 45 or older for contemporary relevance, to avoid racial confounding, and to allow family formation to have occurred. Mean number of children among whites, by sex and class:


With social class, too, a 'dysgenic' trend emerges among women but not among men (or a very attenuated one, anyway--there is still the issue of parental age at birth).

I've seen speculation that intelligence, especially among boys, correlates more with that of their mothers than their fathers. Here's to hoping that's not true.

At first blush it seems unlikely that intelligence is primarily determined by the mother. It would make a seemingly evolutionarily important trait, intelligence, an almost random byproduct of other selection forces. Intelligence is not high on the list of what men look for in women. Women value intelligence in mate selection more than men do, so it would be odd if the mother's intelligence was primarily determinative of the child's.

GSS variables used: RACECEN1(1), HISPANIC(1), CHILDS, SEX, AGE(45-89), CLASS

Sunday, May 21, 2017

Let Alex Jones' tears splash all over you

With Vox Day as an impetus, the table below lists the 41 biggest names in news and current events online in the US over the last year (from May 22nd, 2016 to May 20th, 2017) as measured by Google Trends searches.

A brief technical note: Trends allows five terms to be compared at a time and calibrates the search volume values of each term relative to the search volumes of the other four inputted terms. The second column in the table shows each person's search volume scaled against the king of the internet, Alex Jones, whose value is set at 10. Values are rounded to the nearest whole number but are ordered by search volume throughout (ie, both Mark Levin and Don Lemon round to 1, but Levin generated more interest than Lemon and is ranked accordingly; Lemon is then ahead of Van Jones for the same reason, etc).

Come and see:

PersonScore
1) Alex Jones10
2) Tomi Lahren6
3) Rush Limbaugh5
4) Ann Coulter5
5) Milo Yiannopolous5
6) Sean Hannity5
7) Bill O'Reilly5
8) Rachel Maddow4
9) Anderson Cooper4
10) Glenn Beck3
11) Michael Savage2
12) Tucker Carlson2
13) Laura Ingraham2
14) Richard Spencer2
15) Mark Levin1
16) Don Lemon1
17) Van Jones1
18) Shepard Smith1
19) Lester Holt1
20) Paul Krugman1
21) Brian Williams1
22) Jake Tapper1
23) Paul Joseph Watson1
24) Neil Cavuto1
25) Dana Perino1
26) David Brooks1
27) Charles Krauthammer1
28) Chris Matthews1
29) David Muir1
30) George Will1
31) Ta-Nehisi Coates1
32) Gavin McInnes1
33) Jorge Ramos1
34) Maureen Dowd0
35) Wolf Blitzer0
36) Lou Dobbs0
37) Erin Burnett0
38) Michelle Malkin0
39) Bill Kristol0
40) Terry Gross0
41) Bret Baier0

Mostly (white) men, around one-quarter Jewish, more blacks than Hispanics, one Asian just making the cut--no big demographic surprises. Jews do tend to constitute higher proportions on lists like these than they do on this one in particular. That this one is based on actual user searches--as opposed to news services or magazine doing the ranking--suggests some circle jerking occurs when the media honors itself. Shocker, I know.

A lot of people on the Alt Right, myself included, were wary about Richard Spencer seemingly walking into a media trap, but the rules of the game have changed--maybe so much that no matter how bad the publicity, if there's something good or interesting underneath, people will find their way to the latter by way of the former. He's out there doing it, not afraid to walk into a den of thieves.

I recall Trump making an appearance on Alex Jones' radio show early on in the campaign, before the primaries had started, and the predictable talk of how doing such a 'fringe' venue would underscore the idea that Trump was an unserious candidate. How wrong they were. In the virtual world, everyone is on the fringe relative to Jones.

I spent an hour or so searching for commentators I was unfamiliar with. The only name on the list totally unbeknownst to me prior to putting this together is Erin Burnett. That may be an indication that I unintentionally screened out some people who should be included (near the bottom of the list, I hope--if not, I really blew it!). I'll update accordingly if and as other names are brought to my attention.

Parenthetically, Stefan Molyneux and Mike Cernovich came in 42nd and 43rd, respectively.

Friday, May 19, 2017

Beyond TFR

The CIA world factbook recently added a field listing of the mean age of women at first birth for several countries. In Chad and Niger, most women are getting pregnant before they turn 18. Sexual relationships that violate laws on statutory rape in the US are commonplace in sub-Saharan Africa, where the age of first birth ranges from the late teens to the early twenties. Most Greek women, in contrast, don't a child until after their 31st birthdays.

The graph Steve Sailer dubs the world's most important:


African fertility rates are much higher than fertility rates in the West, but the population of Deep Darkness would leave Europe's and North America's in the dust even if all three continents had the same total fertility rates.

Here's a (relatively) simple if extreme example to help grasp the magnitude of the difference differential ages of mothers' births have on total population sizes.

We start with a Ebony from Eritrea and Blanca from Belgium. The total fertility rates in both countries are 3.0, and both women and their descendants are representative of their countries in terms of reproduction.

In anticipation of the objection that countries where younger births are the norm are also countries where earlier deaths are the norm, life expectancy in this example is 50 in Eritrea and 100 in Belgium. Both women and their descendants are also representative of their countries in terms of life expectancy.

At age 20, Ebony has her three kids. Twenty years on, Blanca has her three children at age 40 (or Ebony at 19, 20, and 21 and Blanca at 39, 40, and 41 if you insist!), just when Ebony's children are having three children of their own.

Two decades later, the late Ebony is a great-grandmother 27 times over. Blanca is the mother of three adult children.

Another twenty years go by and Ebony, whose children have now passed on, is a great-great-grandmother 81 times over, while Blanca is an octogenarian with nine grandchildren of her own.

Twenty years beyond that--we're a century into our example now--and Ebony, who just posthumously welcomed 243 great-great-great-grandchildren into the world, has 351 living direct descendants. Blanca, who just passed away last month, has 39.

Although both women and their descendants have identical total fertility rates, Ebony has an order of magnitude more living descendants than Blanca does!

Wednesday, May 17, 2017

White despair in the General Social Survey

In 2014, the GSS asked respondents if they had ever been told by a medical professional of any type that they were depressed. Because it was only asked in a single year, sample sizes aren't huge, but they're serviceable for whites and NAMs (789 for whites, 328 for non-whites; about half that for the class bifurcations).

The percentages who have been told they have been or are currently depressed, by race:


In a couple of iterations of the survey during the nineties, respondents were asked if they'd gone to the doctor in the past week. Blacks were actually modestly more likely to have gone than were whites and considerably more likely to have gone than were Hispanics (20.1%, 18.5%, and 11.8%, respectively). It thus doesn't appear to be an obvious consequence of whites simply getting more medical attention than anyone else.

The following graph further insinuates as much. The percentages of depressed whites and non-whites, by class:


There are minor differences among non-whites, with the upper half of the class distribution actually appearing to be a bit more prone to depression than the lower half. Among whites, though, the class distinction is Charles-Murray-clear.

If not for the attention drawn to an increase in the rates of working-class white deaths of despair by the now famous paper from the Princeton pair, this is something I would've likely never noticed.

GSS variables used: ETHNIC(17), RACE(1)(2), RACECEN1(1)(2), HISPANIC(1)(2-50), DEPRESS, CLASS(1-2)(3-4), GODOC

Sunday, May 14, 2017

Will screwing sexbots screw us?

Heartiste's take on the coming sexbot revolution is probably an accurate auguring of what will come to pass:
The Sexbot Revolution (it’s happening), in conjunction with the introduction of the male Pill, will upend the sexual market and bring chaos to long-established and evolved implicit rules of conduct. The biggest impact will be a reduction in the asking price of women (in normie terms: a lot of sub-hottie women will have to date below their league if they don’t want to be alone). Sexbots, and other realistic simulacra of sex with a hot woman, will occupy the attention and, ahem, energy of a mass of omega and beta males who will prefer the intense experience of release with their Minka Kelly lookalike bots over uninspiring sex with the human plain janes and fatties who would normally be their lot.
It's not inconceivable, though, that the development instead turns out to be a saving grace, putting the West's native stock back on the path to replacement fertility. Here's how it might look.

Not only is the female asking price reduced by what amounts to an almost infinite supply of real women plus their artificial fleshpot lookalikes, men--all men, no matter their level of attractiveness--experience a genuine increase in desirability in the eyes of women by way of of an across-the-board leveling up of men's abundance mentality.

This could be disastrous:



On the other hand, the assumption here is that given unlimited access, men would take it easy, a la "civilization is men's attempt to impress women". That's a rather gynocentric spin on a quip whose scope is sufficiently larger: "Civilization is men's attempt to acquire dominance" (one major benefit of which is access to women).

Genghis Khan was no slouch. He spread his seed far and wide but he didn't actually spend much time getting women to spread their legs. Cut out the courtship--even its most expedited, maximally efficient manifestation, tight Game--and there's a lot of time leftover for other things. Top athletes, rockstars, and other celebrities don't have to expend much effort getting laid by groupies who throw themselves at said natural alphas.

The sexbot revolution doesn't require men to date robots, it just makes jacking off indistinguishable from the real deal.

The modal man doesn't actually want to have sex more than a few times a day. Futurama, again:



Sexbots are the simulacrums that allow beta men to stop being solemn suckers.

Women are no longer the gatekeepers of sex, but that doesn't have anything to do with procreation per se. In the modern West, the separation of procreation and fornication happened half a century ago. We're already a couple generations into that.

Throughout most of human history, natural selection favored fornication. Procreation was a seemingly inseparable consequence. Now they are not only separable but are actually largely separate.

We have a situation now where most women who want to procreate can do so (though many of the men they'd like to procreate with don't want to procreate with them), some men who want to procreate can do so (though many are limited in who they are able to procreate with by the dynamics of the sexual market ), and some men who want to procreate cannot.

By lowering the female asking price and boosting all men's desirability, many men who desired procreation but were denied it on account of their inability to fornicate in a world where women were the sexual gatekeepers now find themselves able to have children. Women who want to procreate but who were holding out for a man beyond their reach now see a wider pool of men as desirable on account of fewer men being desperate.

In short, we're already well past the  point where the desire to have children is the primary limiting factor on Western fertility. Sexual market dynamics, however, preclude some people--mostly but not exclusively men--who desire children from having them. The sexbot revolution allows many of those who were precluded to get into the game without throwing anyone else out of it (and possibly making alpha men who are on the fence about fathering children more willing to do so on account of being able to continue to enjoy sexual variety both by way of the sexbot option and also a presumed further reduction in the social sanction that accompanies male infidelity).

An increase in fecundity results.

An open question that I didn't address is how sexbots will be viewed inside the confines of a monogamous relationship. Can a man cheat with a sexbot anymore than he 'cheats' when he masturbates?

Friday, May 12, 2017

Septimius Severus' advice to his sons

Agnostic on the political-industrial alignment:
Why has the military latched onto the GOP so much in recent decades, and Wall Street so much onto the Democrats? As the parties have become increasingly aligned with liberals or conservatives, it has driven the more conservative military to the GOP and the more liberal financiers to the Democrats.

The voter bases reflect this split as well, with conservatives identifying more with the military, and liberals more with business professionals. This boils down to liberals being more abstract and cerebral, and conservatives being more concrete and physical in orientation (nerds vs. jocks, Jews vs. Celts).
Since its inception, the GSS has queried respondents about federal government spending on "the military, armaments, and defense" with three possible responses--"too little", "too much", or "about right". The following graphs show the percentage of liberals and conservatives, by decade, who gave other than a goldilocks answer:



The differences Agnostic identifies were clear during the Nixon administration and are even starker today, mostly on account of many conservatives clamoring for more military spending and few conservatives demanding less of it. The trend really got going after 9/11, and even as large year-over-year increases in military spending happened throughout the 2000s, the numbers of conservatives who wanted more spending still increased.

Following the end of the Cold War, when Pat Buchanan called for the troops to come home, military spending to be reigned in, and NATO to be retired, the grassroots were divided on how to proceed. It was conceivable that, having spent the Soviet Union into collapse, those on the right would have united in favor of smaller government across the board, including defense.

Instead, Buchanan was run out on a rail, the neocons nestled in, the grassroots urged the party to go abroad in search of monsters to destroy.

Most of Trump's based liked the Syrian airstrikes and a lot of them view the budget deal as a win on account of it netting another prodigious increase in defense spending even though it lacks any funding at all for the big, beautiful wall.

GSS variables used: NATARMS(1)(3), POLVIEWS(1-2)(6-7), YEAR(1970-1979)(1980-1989)(1990-1999)(2000-2009)(2010-2016)

Wednesday, May 10, 2017

Trump's wall of opposition

From Reuters-Ipsos polling, the percentage of those who oppose the construction of a wall along the US-Mexico border, by selected demographic characteristics (n = 1,286; "don't know" responses are excluded):


The Sabine women don't want to come back. Swarthy, swashbuckling invaders taking them captive? Sweet sweet fantasy baby--after all, those invaders are on the right side of history!

Single white women are more opposed to a big, beautiful wall than Asians, blacks, or even Hispanics are.

Married white women and single white men are modestly in favor of it, while the bulwark of support comes from married white men--married white men such as, to pick a random example, Donald Trump.

Just as Trump's candidacy was a referendum on a wall, so will his ability--or lack thereof--to get that wall built be a referendum on his presidency.

Sunday, May 07, 2017

Democracy's decline

Pat Buchanan on the god that failed:
Democracy seems everywhere to be losing its luster.
As the late Lee Kwan Yew famously pointed out, democracy doesn't work in multiracial societies.

The GSS indicates that much of the American public understands that, at least at a subconscious level. In 2004 and again in 2014, the survey asked "How well does democracy work in America today?" Responses are on a 10-point scale, the higher the value the better democracy is perceived to be working. The mean values among respondents, by year:

2004 -- 6.64
2014 -- 5.86

One standard deviation is 2.27, so we've seen the mean shift one-third of a standard deviation in a decade. If we were measuring the average height of the population--an absurd analogy I know, but standard deviations allow absurd analogies to work--that'd be akin to Americans today being one inch shorter than they were ten years before.

The same respondent pool was also asked about the prospects for democracy ten years in the future. Responses for where democracy would be a decade down the road:

2004 -- 6.18
2014 -- 5.39

In other words, democracy is on a downward trajectory and people expect things to keep getting worse, not better. Looking at the latest iteration, the results by age:

Under 30 -- 5.48
30-44 -- 5.77
45-64 -- 6.06
65+ -- 5.98

Boomers are the most sanguine about democracy, and millennials the least so.

By race:

Whites -- 5.85
Blacks -- 5.79
Hispanics -- 5.42
Asians -- 7.12

There is virtually no difference in perceptions among whites and blacks. Sample sizes are too small for Asians and Hispanics (36 and 52, respectively) but such as they are Asians are more enthusiastic and Hispanics less so than are old stock Americans. While Asians may see things moving their way in the future, Hispanics theoretically should too, so I'm not sure what's going on there.

Parenthetically, keep in mind that this is all prior to the last presidential election cycle and the contentious primaries preceding it. It's pre-Trump and pre-Sanders. It's a safe bet that perceptions of American democracy today are even less favorable today than they were the last time the GSS asked about them.

GSS variables used: DEMTODAY, DEM10FUT, YEAR, RACECEN1(1)(2)(4-10)(15-16)

Saturday, May 06, 2017

Blacks more likely than whites to attribute black problems to genetics

In his April Diary, the Derb brought up posts from the Inductivist (still relatively active here) and the Occidentalist concerning changes over time in the self-reported perceptions of why "on the average blacks have worse jobs, income, and housing than whites do".

The response "less in-born ability to learn" has steadily declined from the 1970s through to the present, even as psychometric evidence and increasingly now genetic evidence for that explanation has accumulated over the same period of time.

Part of the change must be attributable to political correctness--"less in-born ability" makes normies squirm more than a value-neutral explanation like "genetic differences" would--but exactly how much is conjecture.

Reminiscing on my fellow GSS data miners, I took a look at the variable I don't recall having analyzed much in the past.

The racial differences in responses are noteworthy. Because the question has been asked in every iteration of the survey, sample sizes are large. For contemporary relevance, then, all responses are from 2006 onward. The percentages of those who attribute greater success in life outcomes for whites than for blacks to the latter having "less in-born ability to learn", by race and a few other select demographic characteristics (n = 9,341):


One of Thomas Sowell's major insights in Black Rednecks and White Liberals--that on many things black opinions and behaviors are closer to those of white conservatives than of white liberals--is relevant here.

On the other end of the spectrum, Jews--all Jews, not just liberal Jews--are even more prone to blank slate thinking than white liberals are.

GSS variables used: RACDIF2, YEAR(2006-2016), RACECEN1(1)(2)(4-10)(15-16), POLVIEWS(1-2)(6-7), RELIG(3)

Friday, May 05, 2017

Clarification clarion concerning college

In a characteristically perspicacious Taki's Magazine article, Steve Sailer writes:
Among respondents who graduated from college in the 1960s, the average score on the vocabulary test, expressed on an IQ scale, was 112.3, almost a standard deviation above average. For each decade since then, the average vocabulary IQ has dropped steadily down to 100.0 (two points above the mean) for those who graduated in the 2010s.

Among those who didn’t graduate from college, the mean score has dropped from 97.3 for those who left school in the 1960s to 89.3 in the current decade.

You might be somewhat surprised by the falling vocabulary test scores because raw IQ scores in the 20th century tended to go up. But the Flynn effect was seen less on culture-loaded subtests such as vocabulary and more on subtests that resemble programming your smartphone.
A couple of clarifying comments I should've fleshed out more fully in previous posts:

- For the cohort having attended college in the 2010s, 100.0 may be more than 2 points above the population mean. The total sample is based on an assumption of a population average IQ of 98, but the total population is whiter than the under-30 population is. At less than 60% (non-Hispanic) white, nearly 25% Hispanic, a bit under 15% black, and 5% Asian, the average IQ of the current college-age American population is probably closer to 96 than 98.

- Average Wordsum scores for the total population have remained remarkably consistent over time (6.11 in 1978 to 6.13 in 2016 with a mean over the life of the survey of 6.10 and a standard deviation of 2.01--in other words the population average has moved an imperceptible .01 standard deviations!). Wordsum scores for whites have very slightly increased from the 1970s to the present (from 6.26 in 1978 to 6.34 today), in line with the modest increase the Flynn effect has had on vocabulary scores.

That average scores for both those who attend college and those who don't have fallen over the same time range without the total population average changing is a result of an increasing percentage of the total population going to college today compared to six decades ago.

As college attendance effectively becomes less restrictive, the average IQ at each level of educational attainment will decline without any necessary change to the total population average IQ. Educational romanticists would have us believe that education increases intelligence, but as the Wordsum--among other measures--shows, that's not the case.

For simplicity, assume that the total population IQ ranges from 50 on the low end to 150 on the high end, a point for each percentile increase. In the 1960s, the top 10% of the general population (mean IQ 145) goes to college while the bottom 90% (mean IQ 95) does not. By the 2010s, the top 40% of the general population (mean IQ 130) goes to college while the bottom 60% (mean IQ 80) does not. In both the 1960s and the 2010s, the population mean IQ is 100 even though the mean IQ of both those who've gone to college and those who have not has declined from the 1960s to the 2010s.

Parenthetically, this results anytime the cream of the crap is taken from the broader crap bucket and dumped into the broader crop bucket--like, say, with immigration of the "talented tenth" from third-world countries to the West, a phenomenon that lowers the average IQ of both the sending third-world countries and the receiving Western countries without (sans differential birthrates!) changing the average global IQ.

- A perceptive commenter also pointed to Google's Ngram viewer program, which tracks the relative frequency of words in books published, by year. Here are the Wordsum words in books published from 1950 through 2008 (the word "space" is shown at just 5% of its total frequency because if included in the results without an adjustment it dwarfs all the others and renders the graph incomprehensible--my thanks to candide3 for pointing out that Ngrams allows words to be rescaled):


"Pact" spiked in the 1940s--ie, the Nazi-Soviet pact--and was in the process of settling back to its historical norm when we pick it up here. Excepting that and "allusion", there hasn't been much change in frequency of the words included in the test over the last several decades.

The commenter's insinuation is that the more (or less) frequently these words appear in books--and by extension the culture generally--over time, the better (or worse) performance on the Wordsum should be during the corresponding period of time.

That's intuitive, but it may not actually be helpful in understanding the dynamics of the test.

Jason Malloy reported on correct response rates by word. "Allusion"--the word that, after "space", has consistently appeared more frequently in books than any of the other words have--has the lowest correct response rate of all. That is, it's the one test takers have the most trouble with even though it shows up in books more than do other words people struggle less with.

Similarly, though "space" is orders of magnitude more common than any of the other words, test takers miss it more than they miss "broaden" or "edible".

GSS variables used: WORDSUM, BORN(1), YEAR, RACE(1), EDUC(12)(16-20)

Wednesday, May 03, 2017

Perverting Luke 15:4

Via Vox Day, news on the United Methodist Church's election of a lesbian bishop:
Karen Oliveto clutched a friend's hand, closed her eyes and wept when she learned last year she had been elected a bishop of the United Methodist Church. Oliveto, who is married to another woman, had become the denomination's first openly gay bishop.

Within minutes, a formal complaint was filed challenging her election as contrary to the church ban on clergy who are "self-avowed practicing homosexuals" - a petition that the highest Methodist judicial authorities agreed to consider. On Tuesday, the court will take up the closely watched case, the latest flashpoint over LGBT rights in a denomination splintering over the Bible and homosexuality.
Vox lays out Christianity's options starkly--maintain what is regarded as eternal truth or be converged out of existence:
Any acceptance of same-sex relationships is sufficient to not only defrock a minister or a deacon, much less a bishop, but merits immediate expulsion from the church. Any so-called "Christian" church that embraces formalized sin, of any kind, is clearly nothing of the sort. This is not even remotely debatable.

Conservatives need to understand that the infiltrators are not seeking acceptance, and that they are not misguided, but they are there to destroy the organization from within. It's not as if Christians weren't warned of these "wolves in sheep's clothing", after all.
The following graph shows the frequency of worship attendance by sexual orientation in the US (n = 178, 222, and 8,897, respectively):


If gays are so spiritually vain and fragile that they aren't involved in the church because it doesn't flatter their egos then it's obvious that they do not and will not ever take the professed truths of the church seriously.

And if the church jettisons putative fundamental truths in an effort to appeal to the fashionable cause of the day, it's obvious that the church does not take the professed truth of Christianity seriously, either.

Pandering to homosexuals--and to virtue-signalers by way of embracing homosexuality--not only makes a mockery of the putative eternal truths found in Christianity, it makes little practical sense, either.

Gays are, in addition to being small in number, are also relatively irreligious. A better explanation for why they don't visit houses of worship is that most of them don't see a point in doing so. The percentages, by sexual orientation, who are firm theists:


A denomination that caters to their  need for validation will end up alienating current members. In the numbers game of community participation, it's one step forward followed by two steps backwards.

Not surprisingly, affiliation in liberal mainline denominations that pitch to the catchers' vanity is dropping four times as rapidly as evangelical affiliations are:


It's almost as if the real goal is to converge churches by infiltrating their organizational structures and governing bodies.

GSS variables used: ATTEND(0-1)(2-3)(4-5)(7-8), GOD(6), SEXORNT

Monday, May 01, 2017

From the ADL's mouth

So far in 2017 Jews have been perpetrating "anti-Semitic incidents" in the US at more than 19,000% the rate that non-Jews have been doing so.

The AP, via Steve Sailer:
The increase continued into the first three months of this year, with reports of 541 incidents compared to 291 in the same period the year before, according to the ADL data released Monday. 
The preliminary 2017 numbers include a wave of more than 150 bomb threats that started in January against Jewish community centers and day schools. Authorities arrested an Israeli Jewish hacker who they said was behind the harassment. The ADL insists those threats should still be considered anti-Semitic since Jews were the target. During the same period, a former journalist in St. Louis was also charged with threatening Jewish organizations as part of a bizarre campaign to intimidate his former girlfriend. But authorities believe the Israeli man is primarily responsible.
Those are the numbers, I didn't write them.