Thursday, May 25, 2017

Gays don't see fidelity, monogamy as intrinsic to marriage

Since the GSS began explicitly asking about sexual orientation in 2008, I've been tracking it alongside rates of marriage infidelity. Every other homosexual has cheated on a spouse while just 1-in-7 heterosexuals have. That figure has stayed remarkably consistent over the five iterations of the survey that have been completed from 2008 through 2016.

A common objection to the conclusion that homosexuals have different expectations for the institution of marriage than heterosexuals do is that gays being surveyed may have been in Will and Grace-style marriages before same-sex marriage was legalized through judicial fiat. Now that their lifestyles have been normalized, they'll be no more likely to cheat on spouses they're romantically interested in than straight people are.

Having actually interacted with gay men, that strikes me as total nonsense. Open relationships, if not the norm among buggers, are at least quite common. The expectation of an open relationship between man and wife is an unusual exception. That's not at all the case among homosexuals.

Fortunately, the GSS also asks respondents how they feel, morally, about extramarital affairs. The following graph shows the percentages, by sexual orientation, who identify it as "always wrong". All responses are from 2008 onward, after same-sex marriage had been legalized in multiple states and it had become obvious to everyone that it was only a matter of time before leviathan would bless it nationwide:

Homosexuals simply don't view marriage as definitionally monogamous. This was a leading argument against same-sex marriage put forth by badwhites who futilely opposed same-sex marriage in the early- and mid-2000s. They asserted that the lax standards characterizing gay relationships would seep into societal expectations for the institution of marriage itself if gays were permitted to marry one another. Their concerns were snarkily dismissed as homophobic fear-mongering, but they've been proven right and the sodomite apologists proven wrong.

That won't make any difference, of course. The cultural ratchet only turns one direction--always to the left, towards humanity-denying equalism.

With same-sex marriage taken care of, the next major push will either be for the normalization of pedophilia or open marriages. My money is on the latter coming first. The New York Times promotes it fairly frequently, most recently a couple of weeks ago in an article entitled "Is an open marriage a happier marriage?"

When the Muslim population in the US grows large enough, the push for polygamy will get going as well. At the moment, though, its association with Mormonism is keeping it off the table.

GSS variables used: SEXORNT, XMARSEX(1)

Tuesday, May 23, 2017

Social class and fertility in 21st century America

Several years ago I looked at fertility among whites by sex and intelligence (as measured by Wordsum scores) and found that to the extent that the trend is dysgenic, it is almost exclusively so among women. Among whites, high IQ men have as many children as low IQ men do. That's not the case for women, and education--rather than intelligence per se--looks like the 'culprit'.

A basic understanding of mating market dynamics makes this easy to comprehend. Many men have no problem marrying 'down' in status. It often makes for a happier relationship for both sexes in those situations. Heartiste calls this the Boss-Secretary Sexual Strategy (BoSSS).

Women, however, do have a problem marrying down. And by the time women have spent a decade in college climbing the social ladder they're not as attractive as they were when they started, while men who spend a (productive) decade in college are more attractive than they were when they started.

Here's looking at that from another angle, that of social class. It's elegant in its simplicity and utility in that it combines several attributes--intelligence, income, education, etc--into a single variable, albeit a self-reported one. The GSS allows four responses for social class; lower-, working-, middle-, and upper-, with the distribution among non-Hispanic whites at about 5%-40%-50%-5%, respectively.

All data is from 2000 onward among whites aged 45 or older for contemporary relevance, to avoid racial confounding, and to allow family formation to have occurred. Mean number of children among whites, by sex and class:

With social class, too, a 'dysgenic' trend emerges among women but not among men (or a very attenuated one, anyway--there is still the issue of parental age at birth).

I've seen speculation that intelligence, especially among boys, correlates more with that of their mothers than their fathers. Here's to hoping that's not true.

At first blush it seems unlikely that intelligence is primarily determined by the mother. It would make a seemingly evolutionarily important trait, intelligence, an almost random byproduct of other selection forces. Intelligence is not high on the list of what men look for in women. Women value intelligence in mate selection more than men do, so it would be odd if the mother's intelligence was primarily determinative of the child's.

GSS variables used: RACECEN1(1), HISPANIC(1), CHILDS, SEX, AGE(45-89), CLASS

Sunday, May 21, 2017

Let Alex Jones' tears splash all over you

With Vox Day as an impetus, the table below lists the 41 biggest names in news and current events online in the US over the last year (from May 22nd, 2016 to May 20th, 2017) as measured by Google Trends searches.

A brief technical note: Trends allows five terms to be compared at a time and calibrates the search volume values of each term relative to the search volumes of the other four inputted terms. The second column in the table shows each person's search volume scaled against the king of the internet, Alex Jones, whose value is set at 10. Values are rounded to the nearest whole number but are ordered by search volume throughout (ie, both Mark Levin and Don Lemon round to 1, but Levin generated more interest than Lemon and is ranked accordingly; Lemon is then ahead of Van Jones for the same reason, etc).

Come and see:

1) Alex Jones10
2) Tomi Lahren6
3) Rush Limbaugh5
4) Ann Coulter5
5) Milo Yiannopolous5
6) Sean Hannity5
7) Bill O'Reilly5
8) Rachel Maddow4
9) Anderson Cooper4
10) Glenn Beck3
11) Michael Savage2
12) Tucker Carlson2
13) Laura Ingraham2
14) Richard Spencer2
15) Mark Levin1
16) Don Lemon1
17) Van Jones1
18) Shepard Smith1
19) Lester Holt1
20) Paul Krugman1
21) Brian Williams1
22) Jake Tapper1
23) Paul Joseph Watson1
24) Neil Cavuto1
25) Dana Perino1
26) David Brooks1
27) Charles Krauthammer1
28) Chris Matthews1
29) David Muir1
30) George Will1
31) Ta-Nehisi Coates1
32) Gavin McInnes1
33) Jorge Ramos1
34) Maureen Dowd0
35) Wolf Blitzer0
36) Lou Dobbs0
37) Erin Burnett0
38) Michelle Malkin0
39) Bill Kristol0
40) Terry Gross0
41) Bret Baier0

Mostly (white) men, around one-quarter Jewish, more blacks than Hispanics, one Asian just making the cut--no big demographic surprises. Jews do tend to constitute higher proportions on lists like these than they do on this one in particular. That this one is based on actual user searches--as opposed to news services or magazine doing the ranking--suggests some circle jerking occurs when the media honors itself. Shocker, I know.

A lot of people on the Alt Right, myself included, were wary about Richard Spencer seemingly walking into a media trap, but the rules of the game have changed--maybe so much that no matter how bad the publicity, if there's something good or interesting underneath, people will find their way to the latter by way of the former. He's out there doing it, not afraid to walk into a den of thieves.

I recall Trump making an appearance on Alex Jones' radio show early on in the campaign, before the primaries had started, and the predictable talk of how doing such a 'fringe' venue would underscore the idea that Trump was an unserious candidate. How wrong they were. In the virtual world, everyone is on the fringe relative to Jones.

I spent an hour or so searching for commentators I was unfamiliar with. The only name on the list totally unbeknownst to me prior to putting this together is Erin Burnett. That may be an indication that I unintentionally screened out some people who should be included (near the bottom of the list, I hope--if not, I really blew it!). I'll update accordingly if and as other names are brought to my attention.

Parenthetically, Stefan Molyneux and Mike Cernovich came in 42nd and 43rd, respectively.

Friday, May 19, 2017

Beyond TFR

The CIA world factbook recently added a field listing of the mean age of women at first birth for several countries. In Chad and Niger, most women are getting pregnant before they turn 18. Sexual relationships that violate laws on statutory rape in the US are commonplace in sub-Saharan Africa, where the age of first birth ranges from the late teens to the early twenties. Most Greek women, in contrast, don't a child until after their 31st birthdays.

The graph Steve Sailer dubs the world's most important:

African fertility rates are much higher than fertility rates in the West, but the population of Deep Darkness would leave Europe's and North America's in the dust even if all three continents had the same total fertility rates.

Here's a (relatively) simple if extreme example to help grasp the magnitude of the difference differential ages of mothers' births have on total population sizes.

We start with a Ebony from Eritrea and Blanca from Belgium. The total fertility rates in both countries are 3.0, and both women and their descendants are representative of their countries in terms of reproduction.

In anticipation of the objection that countries where younger births are the norm are also countries where earlier deaths are the norm, life expectancy in this example is 50 in Eritrea and 100 in Belgium. Both women and their descendants are also representative of their countries in terms of life expectancy.

At age 20, Ebony has her three kids. Twenty years on, Blanca has her three children at age 40 (or Ebony at 19, 20, and 21 and Blanca at 39, 40, and 41 if you insist!), just when Ebony's children are having three children of their own.

Two decades later, the late Ebony is a great-grandmother 27 times over. Blanca is the mother of three adult children.

Another twenty years go by and Ebony, whose children have now passed on, is a great-great-grandmother 81 times over, while Blanca is an octogenarian with nine grandchildren of her own.

Twenty years beyond that--we're a century into our example now--and Ebony, who just posthumously welcomed 243 great-great-great-grandchildren into the world, has 351 living direct descendants. Blanca, who just passed away last month, has 39.

Although both women and their descendants have identical total fertility rates, Ebony has an order of magnitude more living descendants than Blanca does!

Wednesday, May 17, 2017

White despair in the General Social Survey

In 2014, the GSS asked respondents if they had ever been told by a medical professional of any type that they were depressed. Because it was only asked in a single year, sample sizes aren't huge, but they're serviceable for whites and NAMs (789 for whites, 328 for non-whites; about half that for the class bifurcations).

The percentages who have been told they have been or are currently depressed, by race:

In a couple of iterations of the survey during the nineties, respondents were asked if they'd gone to the doctor in the past week. Blacks were actually modestly more likely to have gone than were whites and considerably more likely to have gone than were Hispanics (20.1%, 18.5%, and 11.8%, respectively). It thus doesn't appear to be an obvious consequence of whites simply getting more medical attention than anyone else.

The following graph further insinuates as much. The percentages of depressed whites and non-whites, by class:

There are minor differences among non-whites, with the upper half of the class distribution actually appearing to be a bit more prone to depression than the lower half. Among whites, though, the class distinction is Charles-Murray-clear.

If not for the attention drawn to an increase in the rates of working-class white deaths of despair by the now famous paper from the Princeton pair, this is something I would've likely never noticed.

GSS variables used: ETHNIC(17), RACE(1)(2), RACECEN1(1)(2), HISPANIC(1)(2-50), DEPRESS, CLASS(1-2)(3-4), GODOC